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Gatekeepers and Bridges: Technical Cooperation, Innovation and Trans-Regional 
Brokerage in European SME Networks 
Abstract 
We study the structures of European technical cooperation networks using social network 
analysis to examine ways in which some countries’ companies have high reported 
innovation levels while others are more adept at strengthening their competitive advantage 
through strategic social capital decisions. Data from a recent large survey on the 
internationalisation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is used to identify a European 
technical cooperation network. This network is analysed using social capital and brokerage 
to reveal measures of centrality, bridging, density and structural equivalence. The longer 
established European members show similar structural equivalence, while the same is true 
for the new and smaller member states. Regression analysis shows a strong relationship 
with innovativeness as dependent variable and structural equivalence and bridging as 
explanatory variables. The main findings are, firstly, that the innovativeness of a body of 
structurally equivalent countries is positively related to the gatekeeper role of its countries. 
Secondly a country’s innovativeness is positively related to the outgoing ability of its firms to 
bridge structural holes across country boundaries, while it is negatively related to egonet 
density and occupation of a liaison role. We discuss how this brings enhanced 
understanding to companies and business development organisations about areas for trans-
regional business improvement.  
Introduction and Literature Review 
Firms are able to draw on a range of external sources to search for new ideas, such as 
customers, consumers, universities, and suppliers (Brunswicker & Hutschek, 2010). Product 
developers within firms can deliberately try to reach new contacts in disconnected domains 
to develop innovative ideas (Simon & Tellier, 2011). Many of these sources cross trans-
regional boundaries. There is evidence within Europe that being open for innovation 
generally pays off provided that suitable marketing strategy is adopted (Teichert & Bounchen, 
2011) together with an outgoing approach to technological cooperation in a technologically 
advanced environment (Sofka & Grimpe, 2010). Open innovation is defined by Chesbrough 
(2003) in terms of the way in which the network boundaries of firms are porous allowing 
scope for interaction with their environment as opposed to the traditional closed approach to 
innovation. Recent research focuses on how strategic inter-firm cooperation enhances value 
creation (Enkel, 2010; Lee et al., 2010). The question of payoff is, however, debated with 
regard to the desirability of openness when considering the single firm or collaborative 
strategy (Knudsen & Mortensen, 2010; Badawy, 2010; Dahlander & Gann, 2010). This issue 
is also discussed in a Canadian context (Li & Vanhaverbeke, 2009) where it is argued that 
inter-industry cooperation within Canada has a positive effect while inter-country cooperation 
outside Canada has a negative effect unless the countries are nearby for the sake of 
communication and coordination. More broadly strategic and managerial issues arise 
concerning economic control and the fostering of success and the viability of firms (Dittrich & 
Duysters, 2007). On the one hand there are major issues in the model of the managed 
economy with its emphasis on concern about excessive profits and the abuses of market 
dominance. While on the other hand in the model of the entrepreneurial economy the issues 
of international growth, competitiveness and employment are important (Hagedoorn et al., 
2006; Roijakkers & Hagedoorn, 2007, P. 225).  
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The term ‘structural hole’ was introduced by Burt (1992) to describe aspects of positional 
advantage or disadvantage determined by the way they are embedded in neighbourhoods. 
A structural hole is an absent tie or relationship between partners in a firm’s network. Burt’s 
(1992; 2005) work on brokerage and the structure of competition showed that firms which 
occupy a position which bridges structural holes are better positioned to outperform other 
firms which do not occupy such positions. A key part is played by ‘bridges’ who act as links 
between clusters of firms as information benefits are expected to travel over bridges. One of 
the tasks for a strategic firm in building an efficient technological innovation network is to 
focus on the maintenance of bridge ties between groups of firms in the neighbourhood. 
Bridge ties are valuable in separating non-redundant information sources so that non-
overlapping innovative ideas are brought together (Raegans & McEvily, 2003; Feng et al., 
2011). The structure of alliance networks, then, strongly influences their potential for 
knowledge creation (Schilling & Phelps, 2007) with non-redundant connections contracting 
the distance between firms.  
 
Granovetter (1985) highlights the influence of social structure on market behaviour arguing 
that ‘there is evidence all around us of the extent to which business relations are mixed up 
with social ones’. The cohesion of a body of firms broadly describes their social structure or 
the way in which they hang together whereas the concept of structural equivalence 
describes the way in which they behave similarly with regard to their pattern of network 
bonds, such as symmetry transitivity and reflexivity, even if they do not actually have ties 
with each other (Freidkin, N. 1998; Mizruchi, 1990). The theory of structural equivalence has 
developed through the use of block models (White et al., 1976; Breiger et al., 1975) and has 
subsequently been used in the analysis of business networks (Burt, 1987; Todeva, 2006; 
Pallotti et al., 2011), where the leading assumption is that structurally equivalent actors tend 
to mimic each other which, for firms, means that they tend to form similar tie structures when 
they engage in competitive and cooperative behaviour. The structurally equivalent blocks 
can also be incorporated into the methods of Gould and Fernandez (1989) to categorise 
brokerage roles, such as gatekeeper and liaison by group membership. It is then possible to 
investigate these role relationships between the blocks as well as the overall success of a 
country or block of countries typically measured by some criterion such as market share or 
innovativeness of products. Granovetter (1985) argues that standards of behaviour and trust 
are generated ‘because of the long-term relations of contractors and subcontractors, as well 
as the embeddedness of those relations in a (business) community’. The extent to which a 
typical firm has the freedom and access to such a community may depend on a clearer 
understanding of this behaviour. 
 
Zaheer & Bell (2005) develop five hypotheses using a variety of mutual fund data sources 
gathered from the industry experts in Canada. They then test these hypotheses using 
statistical and social network methods and argue that a firm’s innovative capabilities and its 
network structure both enhance firm performance, while the innovativeness of its contacts 
does not do so directly. However, indirectly, they argue that innovative firms that bridge 
structural holes do get a further performance boost suggesting that firms need to structure 
their network with non-redundant contacts to capture the information benefits from structural 
holes. They conclude that managers must balance their internal capabilities for producing 
innovative products with their efforts to develop and maintain strategic network contacts for 
generating valuable information. Soda (2011) develops two hypotheses relating to innovation 
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in the field of strategic alliances and firm’s networks in the automotive industry and argues 
that brokerage positions and network sparseness produce positive effects on firm innovation, 
while the presence of a firm in a very cohesive network lowers the innovation potential, 
contrary to earlier research claims (Coleman, 1988).  
 
In the following sections we describe our methods, establish our hypotheses and outline our 
results. We both summarise and discuss our findings and close with implications for practice.
   
Methodology 
The methodology employed in this paper is based on previous work which emphasises the 
performance enhancing advantages of strategically chosen network structures as well as the 
ability of a firm to innovate. One area is the work on centrality carried out by Granovetter 
(1973). Another area is the work of White et al. (1976), Brieger et al. (1975) and Friedkin 
(1998) outlining the significance of structural equivalence and its relationship to performance 
and behaviour in a network. Another is the area of brokerage and structural holes advanced 
by Burt (1992). More specifically our study focuses on the works of Zaheer & Bell (2005) and 
Soda (2011) since these provide supported evidence for strategic structures and internal 
policies which enhance firm performance. Since our data is sourced in a European context 
we also base our methods on findings that support the positive relationship between 
innovative firm policies, good marketing and network strategy and the enhancement of 
performance (Sofka & Grimpe, 2010). We use these findings to identify and categorise 
European countries showing evidence of strategic technical cooperation with firms in other 
European countries. The categories relate to areas of current interest, such as countries with 
high innovation levels, occupying dense networks, having central or bridging positions or 
who share structurally equivalent positions with other countries. We also use the methods of 
Gould and Fernandez (1989) to categorise brokerage roles, such as gatekeeper and liaison 
by group membership. We then use least squares regression analysis to identify a 
relationship between innovativeness as dependent variable and a number of network 
measures as explanatory variables.  
 
The Data 
The data were extracted from a survey carried out by EIM (Business and Policy Research) in 
2009 of 9,480 SMEs in 33 European countries (including some countries such as Turkey 
which is currently outside the EU) during spring 2009. The number of SMEs interviewed in 
each country was in proportion to the population size of the country. 7% of the SMEs in the 
33 countries surveyed had technological cooperation with enterprises abroad: the larger the 
company the more likely is the occurrence of technical cooperation. Initial findings were 
published in a report (EIM, 2010). 
Technical Cooperation Matrix  
One of the questions in the survey asks the respondent who represents the SME to name 
the company’s three top countries with respect to technical cooperation abroad (EIM, 2010). 
We use this data to construct a technical cooperation matrix consisting of all the countries in 
Europe. The entries in the matrix are weighted averages of the scores given by SMEs in a 
particular country to their preference for technical cooperation with firms or organisations in 
other countries. So, for instance, 6 Danish companies named Sweden as first choice for 
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technical cooperation, 4 as second choice and none as third choice, giving an overall 
preference of Danish firms for technical cooperation with Swedish firms of 0.5 x 6 + 0.3 x 4 + 
0.2 x 0 = 4.2 (where we have used 0.5, 0.3 and 0.2 for the weightings given to the first, 
second and third choices respectively). In this way we develop a 33x33 matrix with elements 
containing the weighted average scores for SMEs in all 33 European countries. These 
weighted averages measure the typical score for SMEs in a particular country. We introduce 
the term ‘country typical SME’ (CTSME) representing the average or typical SME in a certain 
country with which these scores are associated. The matrix can then be viewed as a valued 
sociogram for analysis using sociometric methods displaying features which are 
characteristic of network data. Firstly the matrix is asymmetric. Denmark’s preferences for 
technical cooperation with Sweden are not the same as Sweden’s for Denmark. We can 
therefore identify ways in which power is structured in the network. We can also uncover 
evidence of structural holes and other network features. The scores in this matrix do not, 
however, refer to any particular SME and so the ties in the sociometric analysis represent 
ties between CTSMEs and measure the likelihood that technical cooperation relationships 
such as bridges between firms and equivalence between structural blocks exist, since the 
more preferences that are expressed for cooperation with a particular country then the more 
likely it is that ties exist between the countries’ firms. 
Technical Cooperation Networks 
One of our tasks is to identify countries whose technical cooperation networks fall into 
certain categories. We then speculate as to the strategic and performance benefits enjoyed 
by firms in countries falling into these categories based on the assumption that success is 
typically measured by some criterion such as market share or innovativeness of products. 
Our analysis therefore makes use of earlier hypotheses proposed by Zaheer & Bell (2005) 
and Soda (2011). The categories we examine are:  
Category 1: CTSME has a high proportion of innovative firms 
Category 2: CTSME has an egonet with low density  
Category 3: CTSME occupies a central position (as measured by indegree, outdegree and 
betweenness) in the European technical cooperation network 
Category 4: CTSME occupies a bridging position with regard to technical cooperation 
Category 5: CTSME has high structural equivalence (to the extent to which countries firms 
are connected to the same others) with certain other CTSMEs 
Our methodology therefore categorises countries on the strategic and structural 
characteristics of the technical cooperation networks formed by their firms. We make use of 
the social network software UCINET (Borgatti and Everett, 2002) to calculate the measures 
of centrality and brokerage. We then formulate a number of hypotheses and perform 
regression analysis with innovativeness as dependent variable.  
Results 
Innovative Firms (Category 1) 
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Innovative activity is measured dichotomously and indicates whether the SME introduced 
any new product on the market in the period 2006-2008. Table 1 shows the proportion of 
firms in each country who have introduced such a new product. Some information was not 
forthcoming from the data set (or was limited in its scope). We were not, for example, able to 
extract precise details on the type of innovation in which the firms were engaged. Nor were 
we able to discover the amount of R&D carried out by the firms. Analysis of variance and 
Tukey post hoc tests gave significant results (p=0.000) following comparison of the product 
innovation occurring in each country. Iceland, Turkey, Bulgaria, Finland, Poland, Lithuania 
and Norway all have high proportions (>30%) while France, Luxembourg, United Kingdom 
and Portugal have low proportions (<15%) with the other countries falling between the two 
extremes. 
Egonet Density (Category 2) 
A country’s ego-network includes the specific country and all the countries that are 
connected to it through technical cooperation (the connection could be either a link named 
by that country or a link from another country naming it). We make use of the measure of the 
density of each country’s egonet. This gives some indication of the degree of cohesion within 
that country’s overseas innovation network.  
Table 2 illustrates the egonet density for each country. This figure measures the density of 
the network that surrounds it. This is the ratio between the number of ties in the network that 
links each country to its partners (including the links between the partners) and the total 
number of links that would be possible in the ego network. Expressed mathematically this is 
D=2g/(n*(n-1)), where g is the number of actual ties between all countries in the egonet and 
n is the number of countries in the egonet. This acts as an indication of the degree of 
cohesion within that country’s overseas innovation network. According to Soda (2011) we 
would want a low density network to increase the likelihood of increased performance. We 
see that the countries with the largest egonets and lowest densities are Germany followed 
by Italy, UK, France, the Netherlands and Spain.    
Centrality (Category 3) 
The centrality of a country with respect to its firms which engage in technical cooperation 
abroad is most simply measured by the number of network ties surrounding the country. If 
this is the case then countries with the highest centrality tend to be the most powerful as 
information will tend to flow through them before it reaches others. The simplest measures of 
centrality are indegree (measured by the total of the incoming weighted ties naming SMEs in 
a particular country) and outdegree (measured by the total of the outgoing weighted ties 
named by SMEs in a particular country). For indegree we see from Table 1 that Germany 
has the highest (95.08) followed by Italy (34.92), UK (27.60) and France (21.88) with all 
other countries having measures below 18. Conversely these countries were among the 
lowest for outdegree while the countries with high outdegree (Iceland at 30.81) tended to be 
among the lowest for indegree. This is a defining feature of the European technical 
cooperation network and undoubtedly leads to many of the structural nuances which appear 
when carrying out network analysis and identifying strategic business characteristics. If we 
also consider that a small number of strategically placed ties can significantly increase the 
connectivity of the network (Watts, 1999) then the identification of weak ties with this 
capability can be of crucial importance (Granovetter, 1973).  
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Freeman Node Betweenness Centrality 
Countries with the highest betweenness centrality are in the best position to exploit such a 
strategy and we use the Freeman (1979) measure of node centrality to identify such 
countries in our analysis. If we add up, for each country, the proportion of times that they are 
"between" other countries as far as SME preference for technical cooperation is concerned, 
we get this measure of node centrality. We make use of the geodesic paths between all 
nodes to calculate this measure. For example, if A is a certain country then the more SMEs 
in other countries that depend on A to make connections with other countries the higher will 
A’s score be for this measure of centrality. This is therefore a measure of A’s power in the 
network with regard to technical cooperation connectivity and is shown in Table 1.   
 Innovate EgoNet% Density Indegree Outdegree Betweenness Bridging 
Austria 0.23 87.90 0.35 12.46 9.27 34.21 30 
Belgium 0.19 84.80 0.36 11.03 7.96 11.97 20 
Bulgaria 0.35 63.60 0.39 2.08 10.10 7.31 36 
Croatia 0.20 45.50 0.47 1.57 10.18 1.63 22 
Cyprus 0.26 27.30 0.50 0.49 9.52 0.13 16 
Czech 0.28 60.60 0.43 7.25 4.67 10.72 12 
Denmark 0.26 72.70 0.44 13.00 10.76 17.01 30 
Estonia 0.19 51.50 0.53 2.18 13.80 3.39 32 
Finland 0.34 66.70 0.45 9.78 6.75 16.46 23 
France 0.11 97.00 0.31 21.88 1.82 28.67 20 
Germany 0.23 100.00 0.23 95.08 3.84 48.68 30 
Greece 0.22 57.60 0.44 6.02 9.22 37.10 57 
Hungary 0.18 60.60 0.42 3.50 6.70 13.23 24 
Iceland 0.44 54.50 0.44 0.17 30.81 31.26 65 
Ireland 0.18 45.50 0.51 1.53 5.86 0.58 16 
Italy 0.21 100.00 0.29 34.92 2.97 63.10 28 
Latvia 0.22 54.50 0.51 2.13 16.98 0.98 34 
Liechten 0.17 21.20 0.68 0.00 6.59 0.00 12 
Lithuania 0.31 57.60 0.48 1.80 14.04 6.83 36 
Luxem 0.12 27.30 0.66 0.24 9.32 0.40 16 
Macedon 0.30 51.50 0.42 0.20 15.77 3.17 30 
Malta 0.23 42.40 0.71 0.25 10.24 0.00 24 
Netherlands 0.23 93.90 0.33 16.04 6.57 27.20 26 
Norway 0.31 78.80 0.37 8.19 21.15 88.83 65 
Poland 0.32 69.70 0.41 5.67 9.24 39.94 36 
Portugal 0.15 48.50 0.46 0.68 7.17 5.12 26 
Romania 0.18 63.60 0.42 2.50 12.84 17.95 36 
Slovakia 0.22 60.60 0.39 2.24 13.10 12.87 28 
Slovenia 0.19 54.50 0.50 2.19 10.46 6.91 26 
Spain 0.18 93.90 0.34 9.53 5.30 19.88 28 
Sweden 0.27 78.80 0.37 17.97 11.57 35.91 32 
Turkey 0.35 66.70 0.45 7.57 8.30 12.86 34 
UK 0.14 97.00 0.31 27.60 4.90 83.69 34 
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  Table 1 Network and Brokerage Measures 
Table 1 gives high scores (>50) to Norway, UK and Italy and low scores (<1) to Malta, 
Liechtenstein, Cyprus, Luxemburg, Ireland and Latvia. To get further clarification of this we 
make use of the Freeman edge betweenness centrality score (not shown), which determines 
which relations between countries are central rather than which countries themselves are 
central. Using this measure reveals that Norway scores particularly well with Iceland and 
Estonia, while for the UK this is Ireland, Croatia and Macedonia. In addition Italy score highly 
with Greece and Luxemburg, while Germany scores highly with Lithuania, Poland scores 
highly with Latvia and Greece scores highly with Cyprus.    
Bridging (Category 4) 
A feature of structural hole theory is the key part played by ‘bridges’ who act as links 
between clusters of actors as information benefits are expected to travel over bridges. The 
task for a strategic player in building an efficient technological innovation network in his or 
her neighbourhood is to focus on the maintenance of bridge ties between groups of actors in 
both the local and global neighbourhoods. A bridge is an edge (i.e. a tie between two 
countries) whose removal disconnects the (technical cooperation) graph. A k-local bridge is 
an edge whose removal increases the distance of its endpoints to a value of k or more. We 
utilise the UCINET routine (Borgatti et al., 2002) which calculates the distance between the 
endpoints of each adjacent pair of vertices (countries) in the graph when the edge 
connecting them is deleted. 
Table 1 shows the values of the k-local bridge distances for each country summed across all 
other countries. The top three countries (Iceland, Norway and Greece) have very high 
scores but also are characterised by high variability within the scores. So, while most edge 
scores for most countries are 2 some edge scores are much higher which leads to a greater 
sum shown in Table 1 as well as a higher variability. This can be illustrated by reference to 
each individual case. The edge between Iceland and Malta, for instance, has an individual 
score of 33, which, as the number of countries in the network, is the maximum possible 
score attainable. This is because Iceland is the only country whose SMEs express a 
preference for technical cooperation with companies in Malta. Similarly the edge between 
Norway and Iceland also has an individual score of 33, the maximum attainable for the edge. 
This is because Norway is the only country with SMEs naming a preference for Icelandic 
companies with regard to technical cooperation. The same applies to the relationship 
between Greece and Cyprus, since Greece is the only country whose SMEs name Cyprus.    
Structural Equivalence (Category 5) 
The concept of structurally equivalent block applies to a group of countries that have similar 
relationships with the same other countries in the technical cooperation network. In this 
context structural similarity may stimulate a competitive orientation in which countries’ firms 
are attentive to each other’s status and interests (Burt, 1987). Accordingly the strategy for 
countries in the same block may be initially identified as following a joint policy of increasing 
innovativeness since their networks are structurally equivalent. We apply this concept to the 
data in this study and identify, initially two, then four structurally equivalent blocks (SE 
Blocks), making use of the UCINET structural equivalence optimisation routine (Borgatti et 
al., 2002). The two structurally equivalent blocks are:  
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1:  Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Poland  
     Spain Sweden UK                                           
2:  Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Estonia Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Latvia  
     Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxemburg Macedonia Malta Portugal Romania Slovakia   
     Slovenia Turkey  
The results indicate that the longer established European members show similar structural 
equivalence, while the same is true for the new (and smaller) member states.  
 
 
Figure 1 Means Plot for Four Structurally Equivalent Blocks 
Further analysis identifies four blocks, which are illustrated in Figure 1 which shows that 
certain Baltic Sea countries (Block 4) exhibit common structural equivalence. These 
countries also have higher innovation scores. The countries with the lowest innovation 
scores lie in the structurally equivalent block in mainland Europe. Many of the countries that 
have recently joined Europe are in the middle two blocks regarding innovation. 
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                    Figure 2 Digraph illustrating Structurally Equivalent Blocks 
                   (Produced using Netdraw. Line size indicates strength of tie) 
 
Figure 2 shows the countries covered by the survey in the European network together with 
the directional edges connecting them and the grouping into structurally equivalent blocks. 
The line sizing indicates the strength of the relationship between the countries. The blocked 
adjacency matrix derived from carrying out structural equivalence shows that blocks 1 and 4 
(Figures 1 and 2), constituting the oldest established EU countries, attract dense ties from 
other blocks with the exception of block 2 which does not have as many dense ties to block 
4 as to other blocks. 
 
 
Block 4 
Block 1 
Block 3 
Block 2 
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Figure 3. Five types of brokerage relation. Solid points are countries; ellipses and circles 
correspond to Block boundaries. The top point in each triad represents a broker (Gould and 
Fernandez, 1989) 
Finally we used Gould and Fernandez (1989) methods making use of the structurally 
equivalent blocks to categorise the brokerage roles by group membership. Figure 3 
illustrates the roles played by a broker, which in this case represents a country’s typical SME 
(CTSME) within a block of structurally equivalent countries. The CTSME can act as a broker 
in five different ways. For instance a broker acting as a gatekeeper receives technical 
knowledge from a CTSME in a different country block and then shares this knowledge with a 
CTSME in another country within its own block.  
Tables 2 and 3 result from performing brokerage analysis using the UCINET software 
(Borgatti et al., 2002). In Table 2 the countries, having been previously partitioned into 
structurally equivalent blocks, have been given brokerage scores where each row counts the 
weighted number of times that each country plays each of the five roles in the whole graph. 
The weighting is used because, in this context, we are more interested in group relations 
between blocks of countries. As an example suppose that a country, B, acts as a 
representative between countries A and C (Figure 3) while some other actor, D, is also 
acting as a representative between A and C (not shown in Figure 3) then B and D would 
each get half the score for this role rather than the full score.  
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 Coordinator Gatekeeper Representative Consultant Liaison Total 
Block --------------- --------------- -------------------- -------------- ---------- -------- 
Austria 0 0.9 5.497 10.494 16.999 33.89 
Belgium 0.67 0.76 2.538 2.6 6.231 12.799 
Germany 0.368 0.95 3.593 1.042 7.363 13.316 
Italy 0.316 2.892 9.723 14.908 15.212 43.051 
UK 0.67 0.725 18.669 13.497 27.294 60.855 
Spain 0.1 1.851 1.982 3.428 12.544 19.904 
Netherlands 0 0.425 5.069 4.53 14.479 24.503 
France 0 1.518 4.25 8.158 18.099 32.025 
Average 0.266 1.253 6.415 7.332 14.778 30.043 
Cyprus 0 0 0.125 0 0 0.125 
Croatia 0.81 0.811 0.125 0 0 1.746 
Ireland 0.125 0.236 0.143 0 0 0.504 
Greece 1.125 6.661 0.278 0.1 0.993 9.156 
Hungary 1.343 1.325 4.322 1.095 2.525 10.61 
Czech 0.643 1.135 3.311 1.944 3.583 10.616 
Macedon 0.5 0.111 0.958 0 0.726 2.296 
Luxem 0 0 0 0.243 0.143 0.386 
Liechten 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovakia 3 4.111 3.686 0.669 1.084 12.55 
Portugal 0 2.381 0 0.1 1.393 3.873 
Average 0.686 1.525 1.177 0.377 0.950 4.715 
Bulgaria 0.333 2.31 0.768 1.035 2.385 6.831 
Lithuania 0.367 2.367 0.4 0.111 0.597 3.842 
Latvia 0 0.333 0.31 0.111 0 0.754 
Romania 1.167 5.819 1.497 1.729 4.49 14.702 
Estonia 0 2.333 0 0.292 0.403 3.028 
Slovenia 0 0 1.211 1.234 2.693 5.138 
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 0.75 2.317 1.548 1.802 3.869 10.286 
Iceland 0 1 0 0 0.111 1.111 
Average 0.291 1.831 0.637 0.702 1.616 5.077 
Denmark 0.403 1.869 2.101 2.002 4.919 11.294 
Finland 0 0.492 1.98 3.808 6.746 13.026 
Sweden 0.111 5.773 0.81 4.935 12.969 24.598 
Norway 0 1.629 4.768 13.878 21.366 41.64 
Poland 0 1.877 5.297 5.455 18.917 31.546 
Average 0.103 2.328 2.991 6.016 12.983 24.421 
   Table 2 Brokerage Role Scores (Weighted Method) 
Table 2 shows that UK has the highest total score due to its brokerage activity as a 
representative, liaison and consultant involving countries in Group 2 and to a lesser extent 
group 4. These countries include Ireland and Cyprus with which the UK has strong ties. The 
next highest scorer is Italy which again acts as a representative, consultant and liaison but 
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also gatekeeper involving Group 2 and to a lesser extent Group 4. Italy has contacts with 
Group 2 countries Greece, Portugal and Ireland as well as contacts with Group 4 countries 
Poland and Finland. The third highest scorer is Norway which plays a central role as liaison 
between Group 3 and Groups 1&2 as well as acting as a consultant for Group 3 and 
representative for Group 1 
Block 1 1 2 3 4 
1 0.25 4.25 1.25 0.88 
2 1.00 5.88 2.38 3.63 
3 0.00 4.75 1.25 0.38 
4 0.00 3.00 0.75 0.00 
Block 2 1 2 3 4 
1 0.00 0.45 0.36 0.09 
2 0.18 0.73 0.45 0.36 
3 0.00 0.73 0.18 0.00 
4 0.00 0.36 0.18 0.00 
Block 3 1 2 3 4 
1 0.00 0.44 0.56 0.22 
2 0.11 0.56 0.56 0.33 
3 0.00 0.44 0.22 0.11 
4 0.00 0.22 0.67 0.00 
Block 4 1 2 3 4 
1 0.20 1.40 4.40 0.60 
2 0.40 1.20 4.60 1.20 
3 0.00 2.00 4.80 0.60 
4 0.00 1.00 2.00 0.00 
Table 3 Brokerage Block Relations (Average Scores)  
Table 3 illustrates the frequency with which countries in each block are involved in relations 
among and within each of the other blocks. We see, for instance, that the countries of Block 
1 (Austria, Belgium, Germany etc.) have stronger relations with countries in block 2 than 
other blocks. The score 5.88 refers to the role of consultant indicating the amount of 
connections made by block 1 countries acting as a consultant to block two countries by 
connecting a member of block 2 to another member of block 2 (1-2-2). The main consultants 
in block 1 are Italy, UK and Austria (Table 2). The score 4.25 refers to the role of 
representative indicating the amount of connections made by block 1 countries acting as a 
representative in block 2 (1-1-2). The main representative in block 1 is UK mostly involving 
block 2. The UK’s other significant roles are as a consultant for block 2 and as a liaison 
between blocks 2 and 3 and also between blocks 2 and 4. The role of gatekeeper is 
reflected for each block by the scores attracted from other blocks. So, for instance, block 1 
attracts a score of 1.0 from block 2 due mainly to the role of Italy as a gatekeeper (2-1-1). 
The main gatekeepers for block 2 are Greece and Slovakia, while for block 3 the main 
gatekeeper is Romania. The gate-keeping role for block 4 is mainly carried out by Sweden 
through attracting ties from block 2 countries giving a score of 1.20 (2-4-4).  
Summary Analysis 
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We summarise by attending to the relationship between innovativeness (category 1) and the 
other categories outlined above. Least squares regression found little relationship between 
innovation and egonet size but a weak negative relationship between innovation and density 
which was not statistically significant (R-Square=0.007, p=0.64). There is a strong positive 
linear relationship between a country’s outdegree and its innovation (R-Square=0.327, 
p=0.0005), but no significant relationship between indegree or betweenness centrality and 
innovation. There is a positive linear relationship between occupying a bridging position and 
innovativeness (R-Square=0.275, p=0.002). Some values indicate mild exceptions (>1.5 
Standard deviations). For instance Finland and Turkey (as well as Bulgaria, Czech Republic 
and Iceland) have higher innovativeness levels than predicted by their bridging positions 
while the UK (as well as France and Greece) has a lower innovation level than predicted.  
Analysis of variance on the levels of innovativeness of countries attached to structurally 
equivalent blocks show that when the countries were divided into two structural blocks there 
is no significant difference between the innovativeness of the blocks. However when they 
are split into four blocks there is a significant difference (ANOVA, p=0.007) with the greatest 
difference between block 1 and blocks 3 and 4. There is a strong correlation between 
innovativeness (averaged over a block) and the CTSME gatekeeper role, while there is a 
negative correlation between innovativeness and the liaison role (Table 4). Mild effects were 
registered for the other roles. These were a positive relation between coordinator and 
innovativeness and a negative relationship between innovativeness and representative or 
consultant. 
 Innovate Gatekeeper 
Block Average 
Density Bridging Outdegree Liaison 
Innovate 1 .550
**
 -.084 .516
**
 .568
**
 -.090 
Gatekeeper 
Block Average 
.550
**
 1 .256 .368
*
 .466
**
 -.052 
Density -.084 .256 1 -.258 .198 -.641
**
 
Bridging .516
**
 .368
*
 -.258 1 .693
**
 .202 
Outdegree .568
**
 .466
**
 .198 .693
**
 1 -.252 
Liaison -.090 -.052 -.641
**
 .202 -.252 1 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01(Two-tailed) 
Table 4 Means, standard deviations and correlations                
In Table 4 we present a correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for our variables. We 
then formulate a number of multiple regression models with innovativeness as dependent 
variable: 
Hypothesis 1: CTSMEs enhance their innovativeness by having high outdegree  
Hypothesis 2: CTSMEs enhance their innovativeness by bridging structural holes 
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Hypothesis 3: CTSMEs reduce their innovativeness by occupying dense networks 
Hypothesis 4: CTSMEs reduce their innovativeness by occupying a liaison role 
Hypothesis 5: Gatekeeper CTSMEs enhance their block’s innovativeness 
Dependent Variable Hypothesis Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Innovativeness  Coeff Sig Coeff Sig Coeff Sig Coeff Sig 
Explanatory Variable          
Constant  .235 .000 .235 .000 .235 .000 .226 .000 
Outdegree 1 .023 .192   .027 .022   
Bridging 2 .005 .762 .023 .060 
 
 
  
Density 3 -.031 .038 -.027 .065 -.033 .018 -.033 .013 
Liaison 4 -.020 .156 -.027 .050 -.019 .157 -.026 .039 
Gatekeeper Block Average 5 .035 .006 .038 .003 .036 .004 .042 .000 
Bridging*Outdegree 1&2       .014 .007 
  
  
  
    
VIF  <3.5  <2.1  <1.9  <1.9  
R-Squared Adj.  0.448  0.432  0.466  0.504  
     Table 5 Results of Regression Analysis  
Table 5 shows the results of four models. Four of our five hypotheses relate to the 
association between CTSMEs enhancing their innovativeness and four factors. The first 
hypothesis associates high outdegree, the second associates the bridging of structural holes, 
the third associates a negative effect of dense networks, while the fourth associates a 
negative effect of occupying a liaison brokerage role. All four of these hypotheses are 
supported. The fifth hypothesis associates a CTSME’s gatekeeper role with the 
innovativeness of the block to which the broker belongs. This hypothesis is also supported. 
Model 4 replaces the bridging and outdegree variables with a single variable, interpreted as 
outgoing bridgers, CTSMEs who achieve bridging through outgoing ties rather than through 
incoming ties.  
We summarise the main structural characteristics for each block as follows:  
1.) SE Block 1. The countries in this block have high brokerage totals with strong scores 
for representative, consultant and liaison roles (Table 2). They are representatives for 
block 2 and 3 countries as well as liaisons (2-3 and 3-2) and consultants and 
gatekeepers for Block 2 countries (Table 3). The main gatekeeper is Italy which 
attracts ties from block 2.  The block 1 countries are homogeneous with regard to 
bridging (Table 1) with the exceptions of France (low bridging level) and the UK (high 
bridging level).  
2.) SE Block 2. The countries in this block have the lowest brokerage totals. They are 
consultants and representatives for block 3 as well as coordinators for block 2 and 
gatekeepers for blocks 1 and 3. The main gatekeepers are Greece and Slovakia. The 
block 2 countries have medium to low scores for bridging capacity (with the exception 
of Greece which has a high score and Czech Republic and Liechtenstein with very 
low scores) as well as medium to low scores for innovativeness with the exceptions 
of Macedonia and the Czech Republic which have high scores.    
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3.)  SE Block 3. The countries in this block have low brokerage scores. They are 
gatekeepers for blocks 2, 3 and 4 as well as consultants for block 2 (Table 3). The 
main gatekeeper is Romania which maintains ties with all other blocks. The block 3 
countries have high scores for bridging capacity (with the exception of Malta and 
Slovenia) as well as medium to high scores for innovativeness (with the exceptions of 
Romania, Estonia and Slovenia) which have lower scores.  
4.) SE Block 4. The countries in this block have high brokerage scores. They are 
gatekeepers and consultants for blocks 2, 1 and 3 as well as liaisons (1-3, 2-3) and 
representatives for block 3. The main gatekeeper for this block is Sweden, which 
attracts ties from block 2 countries. The countries in block 4 have high scores for 
innovativeness as well as medium to high scores, with the exception of Finland, for 
bridging capacity.   
Conclusion (including implications for practice)    
Small firms operating in trans-regional markets face important decisions about how to 
improve performance. Previous research indicates that improvement is achieved through 
increasing innovativeness and/or improving network and brokerage capacity, typically 
measured using centrality, bridging of structural holes and network density with regard to 
technical cooperation. We demonstrate a positive association between a country’s typical 
SME (CTSME) bridging score and its innovativeness. We also investigate the way in which 
CTSMEs achieve competitive advantage through embeddedness in a structurally equivalent 
block of countries with regard to technical cooperation. Each structurally equivalent block 
operates in a distinct manner which characterises its role. The role of liaison has a significant 
negative association with the innovativeness of a CTSME. On the other hand, the role of 
gatekeeper is positively associated with the innovativeness of the block to which the CTSME 
belongs. The block containing the large European countries has high representative, 
consultancy and liaison status in relationship to other blocks as well as having the lowest 
average for innovativeness. On the other hand the Baltic Sea block has a significant 
gatekeeper role, mainly due to Sweden’s network activity, and maintains high innovativeness.  
The role of gatekeeper is strongly associated with innovativeness but is of most benefit to 
the block rather than to the broker (CTSME). This makes sense if we consider that the 
gatekeeper broker (CTSME) attracts technical cooperation from another block and then 
passes it on to other countries within its own block. For gatekeepers technical cooperation 
benefits countries with similar structural behaviour and hence also the broker. On the other 
hand a more direct benefit accrues to a broker acting as a bridge across a structural hole in 
the technical cooperation network. There is also a direct loss to the broker acting within a 
dense egonetwork, since there are fewer opportunities for bridging. Similarly the liaison role 
has a direct negative effect on the broker (CTSME) performing this role, since technical 
cooperation attracted from a country in another block is then passed to a country in a 
different block benefitting neither the broker nor the block to which the broker belongs.         
Key strategic considerations follow from closer inspection of the structurally equivalent 
blocks. The countries in these blocks may be more sensitive about following a joint policy of 
harmonising innovation and bridging capacity due to the similarities in their network 
structures. The practical implications vary depending on the block which the country belongs 
to. Block 1 countries might benefit from adopting gatekeeper roles, since they already have 
strong network links with blocks 2 and 3. The step from liaison, representative or consultant 
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to gatekeeper is not necessarily a large one as reference to Figure 3 shows though this 
might require some cooperative imagination. They might also extend their brokerage 
influence by greater technical cooperation with block 4 countries in the Baltic Sea. Block 2 
countries might improve their gate-keeping role with blocks 1 and 3 through improved 
bridging. Block 3 countries might continue to improve their gate-keeping role with the other 
three blocks while also maintaining their bridging capacity. Block 4 countries might increase 
their brokerage strength by extending Sweden’s gate-keeping position to attract ties from 
blocks 1 and 3.  
    
Specific advice to countries’ companies can also be derived from the appearance of gaps in 
the technical cooperation matrix together with the position of the company’s country within its 
structurally equivalent block. For instance, companies in the Czech Republic might decide to 
explore technical cooperation ties with French, Romanian or Hungarian companies where 
there appear to be bridging opportunities. They might also extend their search to countries in 
Block 4 such as Norway and Denmark in order to explore opportunities arising from the 
weak ties between blocks 2 and 4.  Finland, on the other hand, could explore technical 
cooperation ties with companies in a range of European countries including Austria, Belgium, 
Croatia, Greece, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Macedonia, Portugal, Romania or 
Slovenia, all of which present possible bridging opportunities. France has both the lowest 
innovativeness score as well as a low bridging score and so might strengthen its position 
within the block by increasing both innovativeness as well as bridging ability as well as seek 
opportunities to act as a gatekeeper. UK would need mainly to increase the innovativeness 
of its firms in order to strengthen its position within the block since it already occupies a 
strong bridging position, as well as seeking gate-keeping opportunities. Portugal, Romania 
and Estonia might seek to improve innovation while Slovenia, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein 
and Ireland might improve both innovation as well as bridging ability. Malta and Turkey, on 
the other hand, might identify more ties with bridging potential.  
 
Firms and business development organisations seeking an effective technical cooperation 
strategy need to take into account the features of the particular markets in which they are 
based and engage in open innovation that exploits a wide range of knowledge. The strategy 
should recognise the advantages of seeking cooperation ties with firms that bridge structural 
holes in the network. It should also take into account existing structural features relating to 
the block position that the firm’s country holds in the broader European network. Achieving 
both of these strategic goals is more likely to be successful if the firms are well supported by 
their regional business development organisations and national policy makers since these 
organisations often have a better understanding of the trans-regional business network. 
 
The methods used in this study have some limitations. One limitation is that the respondents 
in the IEM Survey (2009) were asked if they had introduced any new product or service in 
the market in the last three years but the nature of the innovation was not specified. Their 
innovation was therefore self-reported and not subsequently checked for relevance or 
accuracy. The use of brokerage theory in the context of preference for technical cooperation 
with European countries abroad also has limitations. One is that since each firm names only 
a country and not another firm the brokerage and other scores do not actually reflect 
relationships between firms.  But we argue that they do measure the likelihood that technical 
cooperation relationships such as bridges between firms and equivalence between structural 
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blocks exist, since the more preferences that are expressed for cooperation with a particular 
country then the more likely it is that ties exist between the countries’ firms.   
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